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I. Introduction
This Essay celebrates the scholarly insight of Professors
Lyman Johnson and David Millon into an essential component of
contemporary corporate law and governance, beginning in 2005
with their co-authored cornerstone article, Recalling Why
Corporate Officers are Fiduciaries.1 By emphasizing the salience of
common law agency, Lyman and David recast the scholarly
understanding of corporate officers into broader terms that enrich
* David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. For
comments on an earlier draft, I thank Keith Bishop, Richard Burt, Elisabeth de
Fontenay, Ofer Eldar, Andrew Gold, Lyman Johnson, and Emily Strauss. The
Essay benefited as well from discussions at the Symposium conference.
1. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Recalling Why Corporate
Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005). Preparing to write
this Essay, I found in my computer files a memo consisting of comments I sent to
Lyman and David after they’d sent me a draft manuscript. The memo begins: “I
think the basic point made in this paper is sound and that the paper . . . fills a
significant gap in the literature.” Memorandum from Deborah A. DeMott to
Lyman Johnson and David Millon (undated) (on file with author). I’m grateful for
a fitting occasion to celebrate their prescience in this body of scholarship.
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theoretical accounts of corporate governance while also reorienting
theory closer to the law itself. Later publications by Lyman,
several co-authored with Robert Ricca, made a case for the
inaptness of the business judgment rule as applied to officers and
addressed the importance of lawyers’ advice to officers about their
fiduciary duties.2 In this Essay, I examine further implications of
Lyman and David’s fundamental insight, including developments
in Delaware law that it foreshadowed.
Although officers are crucial to explaining how corporations
function, scholarly and theoretical accounts of corporate law and
governance tend to slight officers’ positions as well as the
distinctive quality of their duties. Following Johnson and Millon,
this Essay anchors corporate officers within the common law of
agency, as does black-letter law. Making agency central to
understanding officers’ positions and responsibilities helps to
differentiate officers from directors. Like a director, an officer is a
fiduciary, but distinctively so, not as a mere instance of a generic
“corporate fiduciary” who owes duties of loyalty and care to the
corporation. As this Essay explains, officers’ duties of care are more
particularized than a director’s general duty of care, consisting of
distinct duties of care, competence, and diligence. Moreover,
officers owe additional duties to the corporation: a duty to comply
with a reasonable interpretation of lawful instructions received
from the board or a superior officer, plus a duty to share material
information with the board or others within the corporation.3 An
officer’s decision whether to comply with these duties is not a
judgment call for the officer, just as it is not for agents more
2. See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business
Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 (2005); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca,
(Not) Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 663 (2007); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model
Advice for Corporate Officers (and Other Senior Agents), 63 BUS. LAW. 147 (2007);
Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary Duties, 64
BUS. LAW. 1105 (2009); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca, Reality Check on
Officer Liability, 67 BUS. LAW. 75 (2011) [hereinafter Johnson & Ricca, Realty
Check]; Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Dominance by Inaction: Delaware’s Long Silence on
Corporate Officers, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED: EVALUATING DELAWARE’S
DOMINANCE IN CORPORATE LAW (Stephen Bainbridge ed. forthcoming 2017)
[hereinafter Johnson, Dominance].
3. For these duties, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.09 & 8.11
(AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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generally. Officers’ distinct duties as agents are crucial to a
corporation’s ability to exercise control over their actions.
Venturing into more contested territory, this Essay argues
that when acting as agents—representing a corporation in
dealings with third parties or performing functions internal to the
corporation—officers should be subject to the same liability
standard applicable to third-party agents who provide comparable
services.4 Thus, an officer’s breach of her duties of care,
competence, and diligence should be assessed against a standard
of ordinary or simple negligence, as is the case for agents generally,
not the less demanding standard of gross negligence applicable
under Delaware law to directors’ breaches of their more
generalized duty of care. Agency law focuses on whether an agent’s
performance matched the expectations underlying the principal’s
choice to be represented by a particular agent, a perspective that
reflects the skills and knowledge that an agent possesses or claims
to possess. Corporate officers, a cohort of agents situated internally
within their principals, warrant no different treatment from
externally-situated agents. To be sure, some corporate officers
(especially ones very high in the hierarchy) occupy positions that
require exercising, not specialized or technical expertise, but more
generalized management skills. Membership in this senior
managerial cohort does not displace the officer’s status as an agent
Additionally, to equate officers with directors for liability
purposes undercuts directors’ right to rely on officers as well as the
corporation’s ability to control its officer-agents, wherever situated
within the corporation’s hierarchy. The equation of officers with
directors also effaces some of the significance of the different roles
occupied by directors in contrast with officers. And a board of
directors might well wonder whether the corporation’s interests
would be best served by supplementing its officers’ work with
advice and other work product from third-party agents and
advisors. But supplementing or supplanting work done by agents
situated inside a corporation with comparable services rendered by

4. For an earlier comparative treatment of a few of these points, see
generally Deborah A. DeMott, Inside the Corporate Veil: The Character and
Consequences of Executives’ Duties, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 251 (2006).
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third-party agents may carry implications for efficiency.5 More
generally, situating corporate officers within the ambit of agency
relationships clarifies the contrast between legally-imposed (and
relatively immutable) duties of loyalty and an agent’s duties of
performance. Subject to some fundamental limits, a principal and
an agent may define duties of performance through agreement,
including the standard against which the agent’s performance will
be assessed.
Apart from the issues that engaged Lyman and David as
scholars, this Essay explores implications of a further feature
distinguishing officers from directors, which is the relative fluidity
in meaning associated with “officer.” Agency doctrine, by engaging
the externally-oriented consequences of an agency relationship as
well as those that are inward-facing, provides an analytic
framework that can be a source of insight. This Essay concludes by
identifying an implication for more general or theoretical accounts
of fiduciary obligation. Accounts of fiduciary obligation premised
on the fiduciary’s possession of discretion clash with agency,
centered as it is on the principal’s power to control the agent.
Including agency within fiduciary taxonomy—as does the law—
thus implies the need for a more inclusive definition.
II. Officers and Their Duties
Contemporary corporation statutes articulate much about the
functions directors serve and the powers they hold. For example,
the Delaware Corporation Law (DGCL) prescribes a function for
directors, stating that the business and affairs of a corporation
shall be managed “by or under” its board of directors.6 Other
statutory prescriptions concern directors’ terms of office,
committees of the board, shareholders’ power to remove directors,
and much more.7 In contrast, the statute treats officers more
5. Assessing these potential implications is beyond the scope of this Essay.
On efficiency implications associated with transactional intermediaries situated
externally to their clients, see Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. 573, 590 (2015).
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2017).
7. Id. §§ 141(d) (explaining directors’ terms of office); 141(c) (discussing
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briefly and less prescriptively. DGCL section 142 states that a
corporation shall have “such officers with such titles and duties” as
stated in the corporation’s bylaws or a resolution of the board not
inconsistent with the bylaws, “and as may be necessary” to enable
the corporation to sign instruments and stock certificates in
compliance with other provisions in the statute.8 Section 142
mandates only one function to be served by an officer, which is
recording “the proceedings of the . . . stockholders and directors in
a book to be kept for that purpose.”9 Section 142 also permits the
same person to hold multiple offices unless the corporation’s
certificate of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.10 Thus,
the person charged with the secretarial function of recording
proceedings could also serve as a Treasurer, a Chief Legal Officer,
or a Vice-President.11
Although the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) treats
officers more extensively as a formal matter in five separate
sections, as in the DGCL only the secretarial function is
prescribed.12 Additional MBCA provisions are noteworthy. First,
the MBCA explicitly acknowledges that the rights and duties
originating in appointment as an officer are not identical to those
stemming from any contract between the officer and the
corporation. Under section 8.44, appointment as an officer “does
not itself create contract rights” nor does an officer’s removal or
resignation from office affect contract rights that the officer or the
corporation may have against the other.13 In Part III, this Essay
committees of board); 141(k) (2017) (describing shareholders’ power to remove
directors).
8. Id. § 142(a).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. On the agency-law implications for apparent authority of particular
offices and their titles, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03, cmt. e(5) (AM.
LAW INST. 2006). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 126–
128.
12. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (explaining
that the bylaws or board of directors “shall assign to one of the officers
responsibility for preparing the minutes of directors’ and shareholders’ meetings
and for maintaining and authenticating” records of the corporation mandated by
the statute).
13. Id. § 8.44.
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elaborates further on relationships between contracting and an
officer’s rights and duties. Second, MBCA section 1.40(8)—which
has no DGCL counterpart—defines an officer (but not a director)
as an employee of the corporation, regardless of other incidents of
the relationship between the officer and the corporation.14 Only by
accepting additional duties would a director also become an
employee.
In Part IV, this Essay explores the implications of
indeterminacy in the definition of “officer,” including those
stemming the practice of assigning “officer” titles to employees
whose job functions are not executive or managerial.15 For present
purposes, note that section 1.40(8) constitutes a formal recognition
of a potential distinction between directors and officers.16 More
generally, as Johnson and Millon emphasize, scholarly discourse
that amalgamates officers and directors into an undifferentiated
category, “managers,” ignores critical differences in their
respective roles (and duties).17 Also elided is the basic point that
“officers are accountable to directors.”18 Directors act as or on
behalf of the principal in a relationship with officers as the
corporation’s agents.19
Legal implications of terminology aside for a moment,
contemporary accounts of corporate governance conventionally
assign functions and positions to persons designated as a
corporation’s officers. For John Armour and Jeffrey Gordon,
14. See id. § 1.40(8) (“Employee includes an officer but not a director.”).
15. See infra notes 122–125 and accompanying text (explaining the problems
inherent to this business practice).
16. The wisdom of defining all officers as employees has been questioned.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03, cmt. e(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (citing
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1.40, Amended North Carolina Commentary (iv) (deleting
MBCA definition of “employee” as “unnecessary and undesirable”)). In Delaware,
whether an officer is also an employee is likely a question of fact turning on the
incidents of the officer’s relationship to the corporation. See Haft v. Dart Grp.
Corp., 841 F. Supp. 549, 569–72 (D. Del. 1993) (predicting that the Delaware
Supreme Court would hold that, under Delaware law, whether an officer is an
employee depends on the incidents of the officer's relationship to the corporation).
17. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 1, at 1625 (“‘Managers were, and are,
routinely described to include directors and officers, often with little or no
distinction being made between them.”).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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officers are “executives, tasked with making decisions about the
running of the company.”20 Directors, in contrast, serve as
monitors of officers’ performance, typically through board
decisions on proposals that officers initiate, as well as by
monitoring performance reporting and overseeing compensation
structures and retention decisions for senior managers.21 Tasked
with decisions about running the company, officers hold “power to
initiate corporate decision-making.”22 All true, but centering the
account of officers on their status as agents supplements
inward-looking treatments of corporate governance by underlining
the externally-oriented functions that officers serve. As its agents,
officers represent the corporation in dealings with third parties,
serve as high-level conduits through which the corporation learns
facts about the world external to its own boundaries, and speak
authoritatively on behalf of the corporation. For example, an
officer’s power to initiate conduct attributable to a corporation
encompasses conduct that is tortious.23

20. John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder
Value, 6 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 65 (2014). An officer regarded as an “executive”
in some contexts is not necessarily also an “executive officer” for purposes of the
federal securities laws, defined as a corporation’s “president, any vice
president . . . in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as
sales, administration or finance), any officer who performs a policy making
function or any other person who performs similar policy making functions . . . .”
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-7. Some requirements apply only to executive officers. See, e.g.,
Item 402(a)(3) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(3) (mandating disclosure
in proxy statement of chief executive officer and four most highly compensated
executive officers other than CEO).
21. See Armour & Gordon, supra note 20, at 65 (“Directors, in contrast, are
tasked with acting as monitors of the performance of the officers.”). Likewise, for
Robert Thompson, the primary role of directors is “monitoring managers,” who
“are the key decision makers in corporate decisions, a point that reflects the
influence of market and economic realities more than a command from law.”
Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American Corporations, 71
BUS. LAW. 381, 404 (2016).
22. Armour & Gordon, supra note 20, at 65.
23. For a recent example, see Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 828
F.3d 1068, 1079 (9th Cir. 2016) (subjecting the defendant’s CEO to personal
liability, in addition to corporation’s liability, because the CEO initiated and
directed a promotional campaign that unlawfully accessed plaintiff’s website to
send unsolicited and misleading emails to users of plaintiff’s social networking
site).
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The background against which Johnson and Millon wrote in
2005 had little to say about the legally distinct position occupied
by corporate officers. Emphasizing officers’ status as agents, by
providing a “pre-existing set of expectations,” helps to flesh out
officers’ duties in the absence of a “widely recognized conceptual
grounding for the frequent doctrinal assertions that officers are
fiduciaries.”24 Enhancing the absence, only rarely did judicial
opinions need to articulate the basis for an officer’s duties to the
corporation, distinct from those of directors.25 Post-2005 opinions
from the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery
answer a series of questions, inevitably leaving others
unaddressed. Like these cases, this Essay does not examine
potential implications for determinations about choice of law in
disputes focused on officers’ duties and liabilities.
In Gantler v. Stephens,26 the Delaware Supreme Court in 2008
resolved a question of first impression, holding that corporate
officers “owe fiduciary duties” and that those duties “are identical
to those owed by corporate directors.”27 Gantler nicely illustrates
24. Johnson & Millon, supra note 1, at 1636. As Lyman and David noted,
officers’ status as agents was almost always treated as significant when the issue
was their power to “affect the corporation’s relationship with third parties,” not
the basis for their inward-looking duty to the corporation as principal. Id. at 1609.
25. Compare Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business
Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) [hereinafter Johnson, Business
Judgment Rule] (explaining the judicial confusion as to the distinction between
officers and directors), with Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III,
Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson,
60 BUS. LAW. 865, 870–75 (2005) (arguing that officers and directors are
sometimes the same and it is difficult to distinguish when conduct occurs in the
capacity as an officer versus a director, and that a due care standard makes
officers more cautious so they will seek second and third opinions and incur
unnecessary costs). In later writing, Lyman characterized this absence as a
“silence.” See Johnson, Dominance, supra note 2, at 3. Alternatively, Delaware
law was not silent about officers’ duties, just reliant on the common-law backdrop
of agency, which rarely occupied the foreground.
26. 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
27. Id. at 708 (citing Ryan v. Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 266 (Del. Ch. 2007)). A
few lines on, Gantler characterizes officers’ fiduciary duties as “the same as those
of directors.” Id. at 709. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)
(discussing the duty of loyalty applicable to officers and directors); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (same); see also In re Dole Food
Co. S’holder Litig., CONSOLIDATED C.A. No. 8703-VCL, CONSOLIDATED C.A.
No. 9079-VCL, 2015 WL 5052214, at *40 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (holding that,
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the connection between officers’ externally-oriented status as
agents and their internally-oriented fiduciary duties to the
corporation. In Gantler, after a bank’s board decided it should be
put up for sale and hired an external advisor for insight into
strategic opportunities, the bank’s senior management resisted
and instead urged that the bank be “privatized” via a share
reclassification.28 But the board persisted with the sales process
and eventually directed that its financial advisor and the
corporation’s senior management conduct due diligence as
requested by two potential purchasers.29 The two officers in charge
did not furnish due diligence materials to one potential purchaser
after promising to do so, leading the potential purchaser to
withdraw its bid.30 The board remained uninformed until the
bidder withdrew; management scheduled a due diligence session
with the second bidder only after the first withdrew.31 Although
the second bidder increased its offer price via an improved
exchange ratio and the external advisor assessed the bid positively,
the board rejected the offer and proceeded with the
reclassification.32
The Gantler court held that the facts alleged by the plaintiff
were sufficient to establish disloyalty on the part of a majority of
the corporation’s directors because they stood to benefit from the
reclassification as shareholders in ways not available to other
shareholders.33 Additionally, on the facts alleged, the two officers
breached their duties of loyalty by sabotaging their due diligence
assignment.34 One officer—who also served as the board’s chair
as an officer, the corporation’s General Counsel owed “the same duties that he
owed as a director”). For further discussion of Dole Foods, see infra note 87.
28. Gantler, 965 A.2d at 700.
29. See id. (breaking down the details of each buyer’s proposal).
30. See id. (“The due diligence materials were never furnished, and [the
potential purchaser] withdrew its bid.”).
31. See id. at 701 (pointing out that management was resisting setting a date
for due diligence with the second buyer until the first buyer withdrew).
32. See id. (noting that the board rejected the offer “without any discussion
or deliberation”).
33. See id. at 707 (remarking that courts should proceed with caution in
cases like Gantler to ensure a plaintiff’s claim pled facts sufficient to establish a
cognizable claim of disloyalty).
34. See id. (“From these alleged facts it may reasonably be inferred that what
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and the bank’s CEO—by breaching his duty of loyalty as a director
would also breach “the same duty” as an officer.35 The second
officer—the corporation’s Treasurer and Vice President who did
not serve as a director—aided and abetted the CEO’s breach of
loyalty.36 The Vice President/Treasurer, owing his job to the CEO,
breached his duty of loyalty by assisting with the sabotage.37 Thus,
the officers’ externally-directed actions (and instances of inaction)
as the corporation’s representatives in due diligence with third
parties breached the fiduciary duties they owed to the corporation
itself.38 Given the facts alleged, the Gantler court lacked occasion
to canvass the field of officers’ duties more extensively to consider
whether those duties might extend beyond those “identical to” the
duties of care and loyalty owed by directors.39 Gantler left open the
possibility that defining officers’ duties required a binary choice
between duties that replicate those of directors (and no more)
versus the fuller suite of duties owed by agents.
The Court of Chancery addressed this latter point in 2015 in
Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc.,40 holding that officers owe the
same fiduciary duties as directors as “corporate fiduciaries” but
additionally serve as “agents who report to the board of directors,”
the corporation’s governing body.41 As agents, officers have a duty
to comply with directives from the board as well as a duty “to
provide the board of directors with the information that the
motivated Stephens’ unexplained failure to respond promptly to Cortland's due
diligence request was his personal financial interest, as opposed to the interests
of the shareholders.”).
35. Id. at 709.
36. See id. at 709 (describing the Vice President/Treasurer’s dependence on
the CEO for his own livelihood). On aiding and abetting another actor’s breach of
fiduciary duty, see Deborah A. DeMott, Culpable Participation in Fiduciary
Breach, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon
Smith, eds.) (forthcoming 2017).
37. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2009) (drawing the
connection between the Vice President/Treasurer’s reliance on the CEO and his
assistance in the sabotage).
38. See id. at 708 (finding that the lower court’s analysis of the officers’
actions was improper under a motion to dismiss standard).
39. Id. at 708–09.
40. 132 A.3d 752 (Del. Ch. 2016).
41. Id. at 780.
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directors need to perform their statutory and fiduciary roles.”42 On
the facts alleged in Gantler, the two officer-defendants breached
both agency-law duties; they failed to comply with the board’s
directives by sabotaging the board-mandated due diligence
process43 and they failed to provide information the board needed
by not promptly informing it that a crucial component of the sale
process had been frustrated, resulting in a bidder’s withdrawal.44
Overshadowing these breaches, though, are the officers’ evident
breaches of their duties of loyalty.45
In Amalgamated Bank, by contrast, what motivated the
officer’s actions remains open for further factual exploration. A
stockholder demanded—and the court granted—inspection into
the corporation’s books and records concerning the hiring and
firing fourteen months later of a senior executive, the corporation’s
chief operating officer (COO).46 Under the terms of his employment
agreement, the COO’s firing without cause triggered a nearly $60
million severance payout.47 On the facts alleged in the
stockholder’s demand for inspection, the court found “a credible
basis to suspect possible breaches of fiduciary duty” by the
corporation’s CEO. The CEO had led the hiring process, took
actions that materially increased the COO’s potential
compensation, and decided to terminate the COO’s employment
without cause.48 Allegedly, the CEO “cryptically” withheld the
prospective COO’s name from the relevant board committee early
in the hiring process while seeking its approval for a large
compensation package and then provided inaccurate information
about the terms of the initial offer to the COO, while asking the
42. Id. at 781.
43. Supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
44. Supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
45. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2009) (“The only
question presented here is whether the complaint sufficiently detailed acts of
wrongdoing by Stephens and Safarek to state a claim that the they breached their
duties as officers. We conclude that it does.”).
46. See Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 772 (Del. Ch. 2016)
(commenting that the media provided extensive coverage of the COO’s
termination).
47. See id. at 773 (providing an itemization of the $59.96 million payout).
48. Id. at 782.
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committee to approve a change that doubled the offer’s payout from
options and incentive stock units.49 And the CEO made changes to
the final offer letter to the COO that the board committee had not
authorized and did not inform the committee about the changes.50
In the court’s assessment, why the CEO did these things is
relevant to whether they constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.51
Articulating a range of potential motivations, Amalgamated Bank
begins with “innocent mistake,” one potentially inconsequential;
then negligence in some degree; then an improper motive, perhaps
tied to the fact that the CEO and COO shared the same former
employer.52 But the opinion cautions the court draws no inference
that the CEO acted intentionally to withhold information or to lie
to the board.53
Amalgamated Bank illustrates the significance of identifying
agency law as a source of officers’ duties. Showing that an officer
breached a duty grounded in agency law does not require showing
that the officer, additionally, breached a duty of loyalty, as did the
two officers in Gantler.54 Thus, an officer would breach duties owed
as an agent by deliberately failing to comply with a board directive
although the officer acted in the belief that the officer knew better
than the board what to do but did not otherwise act to further the
officer’s own interests.55 Applying plain vanilla agency doctrine, by
disregarding the board’s directive, the CEO exceeded the scope of
49. Id.
50. See id. (explaining the unauthorized changes to the offer letter
materially increased the potential compensation of the COO).
51. See id. (“Again, based on the current record, it is not clear why [the CEO]
did these things, and the explanation may well be innocent or innocuous.
Regardless, further investigation is warranted.”).
52. Id. For discussion of motivations for action that may breach the good
faith component of an officer’s duty of loyalty, see infra text accompanying notes
95–98.
53. See Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 772 (Del. Ch. 2016)
(“At this stage, I am not suggesting, nor inferring, that [the CEO] intentionally
hid information or lied to the committee.”).
54. Supra notes 27–39 and accompanying text.
55. For further discussion of agents’ duties in interpreting and following
instructions, see generally Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of
Agency and the Interpretation of Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 321 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, eds. 2014) [hereinafter
DeMott, Fiduciary Character].
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the actual authority conferred by the corporation as principal.56 So
to act subjects the officer—like any agent—to liability to indemnify
the principal for any loss it suffers.57 In the terminology of an
earlier era in agency law, the officer breached a duty of “service
and obedience.”58 Indeed, an agent is not spared liability for an
unauthorized act when the act results from the agent’s
misinterpretation of an unambiguous instruction received from the
principal.59 When the agent’s misinterpretation is negligent, the
agent has fallen short of fulfilling duties of care, competence, and
diligence,60 which does not excuse the agent’s departure from the
duty to follow the principal’s instructions.61 More generally, like an
agent’s duty to provide material information to the principal, the
duty to comply with instructions is an integral component of the
principal’s ability to exercise control over its agents.62 Agents who
disregard the principal’s instructions or withhold material
information from the principal undermine its legitimate powers of
control.63
These implications underscore the significance of officers’
status as agents, as well as the distinctiveness of agency as a body
of law. Corporate law itself includes no separate duty of obedience;
56. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09, cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2006)
(describing the scope of an agent’s actual authority).
57. See id. (“If an agent takes action beyond the scope of the agent’s actual
authority, the agent is subject to liability to the principal for loss caused the
principal.”).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 383 (AM. LAW. INST. 1958). This
section states one of a series of duties within a title “Duties of Service and
Obedience.”
59. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09, cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2006)
(providing an example to illustrate this situation); accord id. § 8.09 cmt. c
(remarking that an agent’s interpretation of a principal’s instructions must be
reasonable).
60. See id. § 8.08 (defining the scope of an agent’s duty of care, competence,
and diligence).
61. Id. § 8.09.
62. See id. (listing an agent’s duty to provide material information to the
principal as a component of an agent’s broader duty to follow the principal’s
instructions).
63. On the relationship between the principal’s control over agents and their
duties to interpret and comply with instructions received from the principal, see
id. § 1.01, cmt. e; DeMott, Fiduciary Character, supra note 55, at 325–26
(providing multiple examples illustrating an agent’s duty to follow instructions).
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as Megan Wischmeier Shaner terms it, the duty is “peculiar to
agency law.”64 The duty is integral to the principal’s right to control
its agents, itself a defining feature of an agency relationship.65 How
broadly or narrowly to formulate instructions is the principal’s
choice.66 In the corporate context the board determines, as it finds
appropriate under the circumstances, the extent to which its
directives confer discretion on senior officers.67 The board may
confer broad discretion on senior officers, communicating general
corporate goals or objectives but leaving questions of
implementation and execution to the officers’ discretion.68 But a
board may also furnish tightly or narrowly drawn instructions.69
Additionally, the board’s ability to furnish instructions to officers
trumps contractual provisions that define an officer’s position.70 By
providing such instructions, the board—reacting perhaps to new
circumstances or its reassessment of an ongoing situation—may
cause the corporation to breach its employment agreement with
the officer, but the officer’s duty as an agent still requires
compliance with lawful instructions.71 The board’s right to provide
64. Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate
Management: Enforcing an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 66 BUS. LAW. 27, 44–45
(2010).
65. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2013) (finding the
parties’ relationship to lack the hallmarks of an agency relationship, including
the principal’s right to control the agent).
66. See Shaner, supra note 64, at 49 (noting the importance of this
flexibility).
67. See id. at 49–50 (“[T]o the extent the that the board wanted to constrain
management’s decision making, it could do so through narrowly tailored, explicit
directives on how to act.”).
68. See Johnson & Ricca, Reality Check, supra note 2, at 90 (remarking that
boards often articulate corporate goals broadly, in terms such as profitability).
69. Although it’s likely true that the duty of obedience rarely has much bite
against officers, Gantler and Amalgamated Bank illustrate the significance of the
basic duty. See id. at 89 (explaining the inherent difficulties in making negligence
determinations against officers). See generally Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc.,
132 A.3d 752 (Del. Ch. 2016); Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 2006)
(noting that a principal always has the power to provide an agent with interim
instructions).
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01 cmt. f(1); 8.09(2) (AM. LAW.
INST. 2006) (examining the dynamics between contractual provisions laying out
an agent’s duties and a principal’s instructions that go against those provisions).
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binding instructions creates a flexible capacity to respond to
changed circumstances without renegotiating (and repricing) an
officer’s employment agreement.72
Finally, although corporate law itself does not create a
separate duty to comply with instructions, a parallel doctrine
constrains directors’ discretion to depart from limits imposed by
shareholders in approving stock option and other compensation
plans. For example, when directors make an award of shares in
excess of a numerical limit set in a stockholder-approved plan, the
business judgment rule does not insulate the directors’ decision
from judicial scrutiny into its merits.73 Likewise, directors lack
discretion to backdate an award of stock options without
authorization in a stockholder-approved plan.74 But these
outcomes do not turn on applying a distinctively corporate-law
doctrine such as waste. They might be characterized as sui generis
or as a “peculiar subset” of cases.75 Alternatively, although
directors are not agents within the common law definition,76
directors, like officers and other agents, act subject to constraints
that define the outer bounds of action that is rightful or
authorized.77 The rationale for this “peculiar subset,” in other
72. See Shaner, supra note 64, at 49–50 (listing making changes to bylaw
provisions as another, less flexible means of responding to changing
circumstances that boards are not forced to use because they can give binding
directives).
73. See Sanders v. Wang, No. 16640, 1999 WL 1044880, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov.
10, 1999) (finding the facts alleged by the plaintiff sufficient to cast doubt on
whether the board’s action was a valid exercise of business judgment).
74. See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 357 (Del. Ch. 2007) (determining that
back-dating without authorization was an act in bad faith worthy of rebutting the
presumption of the business judgment rule).
75. See Landy v. D’Alessandro, 316 F. Supp. 2d 49, 69 (D. Mass 2004)
(characterizing Sanders as within “a peculiar subset of that case law where the
violation of a contract is so clear that the violation alone creates a reasonable
doubt that the board acted in good faith and honest belief”).
76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. f(2) (AM. LAW. INST.
2006) (explaining how the treatment of directors in contemporary United States
corporate law justifies their not being treated as agents).
77. In the absence of such bounds, directors who benefit personally from
decisions they make run the risk of losing the protection of the business judgment
rule. See Seinfeld v. Slager, Civil Action No. 6462–VCG, 2012 WL 2501105, at
*10–11 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012) (determining that the directors’ self-award of
units under stockholder-approved restricted stock unit plan fell outside business
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words, consists of limits on directors’ authority bearing a family
resemblance to constraints imposed by agency law.
III. Liability Frameworks and Standards
As the Court of Chancery noted in Amalgamated Bank,
distinct from the content of officers’ duties, a “vibrant debate”
focuses on the framework for assessing an officer’s liability
stemming from a breach of duty.78 When a director allegedly
breaches a duty, the analytic framework deployed by corporate law
does not conflate the standard of conduct, which specifies whether
the director breached the duty, with the standard of review
through which a court determines whether the director should be
subject to liability.79 In contrast, agency law conflates these
questions, as do other bodies of law, including tort law.80
Additionally, when an agent causes loss to the principal by
breaching the agent’s duties of care, competence, or diligence, the
agent is subject to liability to the principal for simple negligence.81
But Delaware gears directors’ liability for breaches of the duty of
care to the less exacting standard of gross negligence.82 Separately,
judgment rule because the terms of plan were insufficiently defined to constitute
a meaningful limit on board).
78. Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 780–81 n.24 (Del. Ch.
2016).
79. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 448 (1993)
(assessing the difference between standard of conduct and standard of review in
the corporate context).
80. See id. at 437 (using an automobile accident as an illustration of this
conflation).
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006)
(elaborating on the specifics of liability for breaches of the duty of care,
competence, and diligence); Amalgamated Bank, 132 A.3d at 780–81 (articulating
these agency principles in reference to officers).
82. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 & n.6 (Del. 1984) (characterizing
standard as “less exacting” than simple negligence), overruled on other grounds
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). Within tort law, “gross negligence”
is defined through contrasts with other forms of culpable conduct, constituting
wrongdoing in an aggravated form that falls short of an intentional tort and of
reckless conduct but is “negligence that is especially bad.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 2, cmt. a (AM. LAW.
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claims against directors are assessed with a deferential standard
of review, the business judgment rule, which lacks a counterpart
in agency law.83 The business judgment rule consists of a
presumption that in making a business judgment directors “acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”84
Shareholders rebut the presumption by alleging facts that support
a reasonable inference that a director breached either her duty of
care (measured against a gross negligence standard) or her duty of
loyalty.85 Finally, like most other states, Delaware permits a
corporation to adopt a charter provision exculpating directors—but
not officers—against monetary liability resulting from breaches of
the duty of care.86 As a consequence, when an officer also serves as
a director, the capacity in which the officer took the claim’s
underlying actions determines the availability of exculpation.87
INST. 2010).
83. See Amalgamated Bank, 132 A.3d at 780–81 n.24 (Del. Ch. 2016) (noting
the debate over whether the business judgment rule should be extended to officers
as agents).
84. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
85. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009) (“On a motion to
dismiss, the pled facts must support a reasonable inference that in making the
challenged decision, the board of directors breached either its duty of loyalty or
its duty of care.”).
86. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2017). A few states authorize
charter provisions that exculpate officers, as well as directors, from monetary
liability. See Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo Magnolfi, Regulatory Competition and the
Market for Corporate Law (Yale Law & Econ’s. Working Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 528, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2685969 (mentioning Maryland
and Nevada). See MD. CORPS & ASSN’S § 2-405.2 (1997); NEV. STAT. ANN.
§ 78.138(7) (2003). Additionally, under Nevada law, unless a corporation’s
certificate of incorporation otherwise provides (and subject to a few explicit
statutory exceptions), an officer is not subject to liability to the corporation, its
shareholders, or its creditors on the basis that the officer breached any fiduciary
duty, including the duty of loyalty, in the absence of fraud, intentional
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138(7).
87. See In re Dole Foods, Inc. S’holder Litig., CONSOLIDATED C.A. No.
8703-VCL, CONSOLIDATED C.A. No. 9079-VCL, 2015 WL 5052214, at *40 (Del.
Ch., Aug. 27, 2015) (recounting that the corporation’s General Counsel, who also
served as a director, “primarily interacted . . . as an officer” with board committee
created when corporation’s Chairman and CEO (also its controlling shareholder)
proposed transaction to acquire all stock he did not own). As a consequence, that
General Counsel was not protected by exculpatory clause; as a director, General
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The vibrancy of the debate surrounding officers’ liability owes
much to the absence of definitive resolution from Delaware courts
themselves. As the federal district court for Delaware noted in a
recent bankruptcy case, the defendants cited no cases from
Delaware courts holding that the business judgment rule applies
to officers.88 In In re Tower Air, Inc., an earlier bankruptcy case,
the Third Circuit assumed without discussion that the business
judgment rule applies to officers as well as directors.89 Given the
centrality of Delaware courts to corporate litigation, this absence
is itself open to competing explanations.90 One is that claims
against officers are more likely to be asserted by bankruptcy
trustees or receivers in federal courts than by corporate directors
in Delaware state courts. The hurdles that shareholders confront
Counsel committed acts not in good faith and breached his duty of loyalty. Id.
88. See Palmer v. Reali, Civ. No. 15-994-SLR, 2016 WL 5662008, at *8 n.8
(D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016) (“Defendants have cited no cases where a Delaware court
has held that the business judgment rule applies to corporate officers . . . .”). The
same was true eleven years earlier. See Johnson, Business Judgment Rule, supra
note 25, at 440 (noting in 2005 that Delaware “has yet to hold squarely that the
[business judgment] rule applies to officers as well as directors”). In California,
no judicial decision applies the business judgment rule to officers and the
statutory business judgment rule expressly applies only to directors. See FDIC v.
Perry, No. CV 11-5561-ODW, 2012 WL 589569, at * 4 (C.D. Cal., Feb. 21, 2012)
(holding that business judgment rule does not apply to officers’ decisions under
California law).
89. See In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that
the plaintiff overcame the business judgment presumption through allegations
that the company’s officers “did nothing” in the face of negative reports concerning
aircraft maintenance and failed to process used airline tickets worth a million
dollars).
90. One potential explanation was the historical difficulty of securing
personal jurisdiction in a Delaware court over a non-resident officer, as opposed
to a director. This potential obstacle was eliminated in 2004 through a statutory
amendment that deems a person who accepts election or appointment as an officer
of a Delaware corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction in suits brought in
Delaware courts. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 10, § 3114 (2017). See Johnson, Business
Judgment Rule, supra note 25, at 440 (noting that “prominent judges” in
Delaware expected litigation to be newly focused on officers following the
statutory amendment). It is questionable whether implied-consent statutes like
Delaware’s comport with constitutional limits on the assertion of personal
jurisdiction. See Verity Winship, Jurisdiction Over Corporate Officers and the
Incoherence of Implied Consent, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1171, 1172–75 (criticizing
Delaware’s use of implied consent and advocating a move to express consent as a
solution).

CORPORATE OFFICERS AS AGENTS

865

as plaintiffs in litigation against non-director defendants also limit
court’s opportunities to speak on whether business judgment rule
applies to officers as well as directors.91 And, like other principals,
directors may have a rational preference to discharge or otherwise
settle up with wrongdoing agents (which in the case of Tower Air
were officers) or may be discouraged from pursuing claims against
officers by inertia stemming from many sources.92 Separately, an
allegation that a director breached a duty of performance may
require more investigation into contextual specifics than would
duty-of-loyalty claims, making duty-of-performance claims more
vulnerable to motions to dismiss.
While acknowledging that much remains open to debate, I
focus first on the application of the business judgment rule to
officers and then turn to the substantive standard applicable to
conduct by officers that breaches either a generally-formulated
duty of care or a component of the agency law duties of care,
competence, and diligence.93 As noted above, the presumptions
created by the business judgment rule do not apply when the
plaintiff alleges facts that support a reasonable inference that in
making a business decision, the actor in question breached either
the duty of care or the duty of loyalty.94 Delaware cases define the
duty of loyalty as inclusive of a duty to act in good faith.95 A failure
91. See Johnson & Ricca, Reality Check, supra note 2, at 88 (commenting on
the barriers to director-initiated lawsuits against officers).
92. See id. at 87–88 (discussing range of potential intra-corporate sanctions).
On inertia and claims against agents, see Harry S. Bryans, Claims Against
Lawyers by Bankruptcy Trustees––A First Course on the In Pari Delicto Doctrine,
66 Bus. Law. 587, 590 (2011) (explaining that, especially in long-standing
relationships, “various sources of inertia at the management and board levels of
a solvent corporation . . . discourage claims against corporate counsel”).
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006)
(defining the parameters of the agency duties of care, competence, and diligence).
94. A shareholder’s complaint cannot survive a motion to dismiss by a
director protected by an exculpatory provision when the complaint alleges only
the underlying transaction would be subject to the entire fairness standard of
review. See In re Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173,
1179 (Del. 2015) (“We now resolve the question presented by these cases by
determining that plaintiffs must plead a non-exculpated claim for breach of
fiduciary duty against an independent director protected by an exculpatory
charter provision, or that director will be entitled to be dismissed from the suit.”).
95. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–71 (Del. 2006) (explaining the
relationship between the duty of loyalty and the duty to act in good faith).
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to act in good faith results when a fiduciary “intentionally acts with
a purpose other than advancing the best interests of the
corporation . . . .”96 A fiduciary also fails to act in good faith by
acting “with the intent to violate applicable positive law . . . .”97
Additionally, and perhaps more broadly, “intentionally fail[ing] to
act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
disregard for his duties” is an instance of a failure to act in good
faith.98
If applied to officers, the business judgment rule should have
comparable limitations, making its protection unavailable when
the facts support a reasonable inference of a breach of the duty of
loyalty or the duties of care, competence, and diligence. The
good-faith component of the duty of loyalty would deny protection
to an officer who acted with the requisite knowledge, intention, or
scienter for a proscribed purpose or in violation of positive law.
More open to debate is conduct by an officer who consciously
disregards a directive received from the board or withholds
material information from the board or a board committee. Would
an officer’s breach of a distinctively agency-law duty constitute
conduct not in good faith, and thus breach the officer’s duty of
loyalty? Or are these duties, like the duty of good faith, themselves
components of the duty of loyalty?99

96. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005),
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
97. Id. For a recent application of this definition, see In re Duke Energy Corp.
Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 7705-VCG, 2016 WL 4543788 at *16–17 (Del. Ch. Aug.
31, 2016) (alleging in the complaint that directors violated state law by knowingly
or willfully providing false information to utility commission concerning identity
of corporation’s CEO following merger that required permission from
commission).
98. Disney, 907 A.2d at 755. The instances stated in Disney expressly do not
exhaust the possible forms that failure to act in good faith may take, only the
“most salient” three. Id. at 756. Another identified by the court arises when
disinterested directors, aware of all the facts concerning a colleague’s self-dealing
transaction (including the colleague’s conflict of interest), approve the transaction
“to reward a colleague rather than for the benefit of the shareholders.” Id. at 756
n.464. Delaware’s statutory safe harbor for transactions in which a director has a
conflicting interest requires that the directors who approve the transaction act in
good faith. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (2017).
99. For these possibilities, see Shaner, supra note 64, at 49.
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More generally, it’s hard to see any justification for
characterizing an officer’s deliberate disregard of agency-law
duties as an exercise of “business judgment.” Like any agent, an
officer lacks discretion to ignore unambiguous directives received
from the principal, even when the officer disagrees with them, just
as junior or subordinate officers or employees have a duty to
comply with lawful instructions received from personnel higher in
an organization’s hierarchy.100 Indeed, the most prominent
defenders of applying the business judgment rule to officers
acknowledge that its application should not extend to conduct
“outside the scope of [officers’] delegated authority,”101 a concept
delimited by officers’ distinctive duties as agents. Put differently,
as an agent an officer does not have a right unilaterally to redefine
the scope of her authority.
That officers are agents is more significant when focus shifts
to the substantive standard applicable to breaches of duties of care,
competence, and diligence. As noted above, directors’ alleged
breaches of the duty of care are assessed against a liability
standard of gross negligence, not the simple (or ordinary)
negligence standard applicable to agents.102 But note that
directors’ and officers’ duties differ in their relative generality
(“care”) or specificity (“care, competence, and diligence”). This
difference is tied to the fact that officers, like other agents, are
chosen on the basis of the skills and knowledge that they possess
(or claim to possess), which range from highly specialized to very
general.103 Additionally, when courts evaluate whether directors
breached duties of care, the focus is the process used, not the
quality of the decision itself or, for that matter, of the
decisionmakers themselves.104

100. Supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
101. Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 25, at 866.
102. Supra note 82 and accompanying text.
103. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006)
(“Special skills or knowledge possessed by an agent are circumstances to be taken
into account in determining whether the agent acted with due care and
diligence.”).
104. See Johnson & Ricca, Reality Check, supra note 2, at 92 (defining the
duty of care for directors as process focused).
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In contrast, agency law focuses on discrepancies between
agents’ performance and the expectations underlying a principal’s
choice to be represented by a particular agent.105 Why apply a less
demanding standard—gross negligence—to corporate officers as a
particular cohort of agents? Applying a gross negligence standard
is especially inapt when the officer in question performs functions
as a member of a profession or particular discipline when
comparable services are available from practitioners who are
situated externally to the corporation.106 For example, why should
malpractice on the part of a chief legal officer be assessed against
a standard of gross negligence, as opposed to the ordinary
negligence regime applicable to departures from the standard of
care by other lawyers who represent the corporation?107 Along
these lines, information internal to the corporation is more
accessible (or more immediately accessible) to officers than to nonofficer directors, which limits officers’ right to rely on information
furnished by others.108 Just as directors and shareholders might
reasonably expect an officer to have relevant on-the-ground
knowledge about the corporation’s affairs,109 so they might
reasonably expect performance in office that’s consistent with the
assumed skill set and capacity for diligence and care that
constituted the premise for hiring that particular officer.110
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006)
(outlining the general principles of agency law).
106. See A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law
Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 220–22 (1992)
(discussing the duty of loyalty and how it differs between the agency context and
the corporate context).
107. For the standard of care generally applicable to lawyers, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 (AM. LAW. INST. 2000).
108. See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 106, at 218 (discussing the official
comment to § 8.42 of the Model Business Corporation Act).
109. Directors’ reasonable expectation that officers have such knowledge is
linked to officers’ duties as agents to share relevant information with the board.
Supra notes 3, 63 and accompanying text. The duty includes the duty to report
information received from personnel lower in the organizational hierarchy. For a
troubling example, characterized by the court as an instance of bad faith, see In
re Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 239 (3d Cir. 2005) (determining airline’s officers
“did nothing” when told by Director of Safety of quality-assurance problems with
aircraft maintenance and failures to record maintenance and repair work).
110. Relatedly, when an agent claims to possess special skills or knowledge,
the agent’s duties of performance are geared to a standard consistent with
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Thus, directors (and others) who rely on officers to prepare
financial forecasts and present them to the board would reasonably
expect preparation consistent with methodologies and standards
used by reasonable persons performing comparable work,111 just as
directors who rely on officers who profess to have expertise as
managers that is more generalized should reasonably expect
performance consistent with that of comparators acting as
reasonable persons.112
To be sure, unlike directors, in most jurisdictions officers do
not have the benefit of provisions in corporate charters exculpating
against monetary liability stemming from breaches of duties of
care, whether stemming from gross or ordinary negligence.113
Agency law acknowledges the possibility of contractual solutions
by embracing a role for agreements between principals and agents
that define in advance the applicable standard of performance.114
This enables an officer to negotiate for specificity in what will be
expected, while also enabling the board to price the value of what
it anticipates receiving in exchange from the officer.115
possessing such skills or knowledge. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (AM.
LAW. INST. 2006).
111. See Palmer v. Reali, Civ. No. 15-994-SLR, 2016 WL 5662008, at *9 (D.
Del. Sept. 29, 2016) (finding that financial forecasts prepared by the president
and chief financial officer departed from established methodology by comparing
corporation with companies experiencing increased revenue, not comparators—
like corporation—with declining revenue).
112. Assuring the robustness of directors’ right to rely on officers is consistent
with perceiving the law on corporate officers as “just one more aspect of
Delaware’s law on directors.” Johnson, Dominance, supra note 2, at 15 (emphasis
omitted) (characterizing corporate management and overall welfare as
“manifestly officer-centric” in contrast with corporate governance, which is
“decidedly director-centric”).
113. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (describing exculpation
provisions).
114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08, cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2006)
(“A contract may also, in appropriate circumstances, raise or lower the standard
of performance to be expected of an agent . . . .”).
115. This long-standing dimension of agency law contrasts with the Delaware
Supreme Court’s characterization of fiduciary duties as “unremitting” and
“immutable.” Mills Acq. Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989).
Read in context, these statements in Mills precede the court’s justification for
refusing review under the business judgment rule to actions taken by a board of
directors, itself deceived by senior officers who sought to gain from their
misconduct in connection with an auction for corporate control.
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Corporate law itself embraces a central feature of the agency
law framework by robustly protecting directors’ right to rely on
officers. As formulated by statute in Delaware, a member of a
board of directors has the right to rely in good faith on
“information, opinions, reports, or statements” presented by
officers “or by any other person as to matters the member
reasonably believes are within that person’s professional or expert
competence and who has been selected with reasonable care by or
on behalf of the corporation.”116 A cautious director might be
reluctant to rely on an officer’s opinions or reports prepared by the
officer or under her supervision, knowing that the officer—unlike
externally-situated sources of expertise—need worry only about
slippages that can be characterized as grossly negligent. In
response, cautious directors might seek more input from
externally-situated agents. A countervailing risk is that the
prospect of greater liability risks for officers relative to directors
would encourage officers to shift more responsibility to the
board.117 But the risk of responsibility-shifting, if identified in
advance, can be addressed by agreement and priced into the terms
of the corporation’s relationship with its officers.
As discussed above, agency law’s framework enables an officer
worried about liability risks under a regime of simple negligence
to negotiate terms that specify a standard for performance.118 In
structuring the terms under which the corporation engages an
officer or any other agent, the board has flexibility subject to broad
constraints mostly developed in cases involving lop-sided outcomes
from arrangements for executive compensation.119 Agency creates
a framework through which an officer’s concerns about liability can
116. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(e) (2017).
117. See Hamermesh & Sparks, supra note 25, at 875 (“[S]uch a disparity
would simply encourage officers to place more decisions in the hands of the board,
and take fewer, and less risky, initiatives on their own, so as to avoid liability.”);
see also Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 106, at 237 (depriving officers of
protection of business judgment rule represents surrender by corporation of “part
of its freedom from judicial scrutiny” in decisions made by directors to delegate
responsibility to officers).
118. Supra note 114 and accompanying text.
119. See Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 106, at 219 n.30 (“In many older
cases, the implication is that the difference in compensation between officers and
directors affects their relative liabilities.”).
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be specified in advance and addressed through an agreement. The
parties’ flexibility, although extensive, is not infinite. In retaining
an advisor, the terms to which the board agrees are ineffectual if
they permit the advisor to act contrary to the board’s interests as
the advisee, undermining the advice on which the advisor knows
the board will rely.120 The same fundamental limit should also
apply as well to the terms under which a corporation, acting
through its directors, agrees to employ an officer, recognizing as it
does that duties are inherent to some roles.121
IV. “Officer” as a Fluid Category
Although not a focus of Johnson and Millon’s scholarship, the
definitional fluidity of “officer” as a category is itself intriguing. 122
How “officer” is defined varies, depending on the jurisdiction and
the question. In Verity Winship’s account, “‘officer’ means one
thing for personal jurisdiction, another for securities disclosure
rules, and who-knows-what for triggering state-law fiduciary
duties.”123 In contrast, as noted in Part III, the position occupied
by a board of directors is defined by the applicable corporation
statute.124 Numerous cases that flesh out the specifics of directors’
status, rights, and responsibilities stabilize the meaning of
“director” as a category. Most of the time, though, in connection
with corporate governance the meaning of “officer” conforms to the
prescriptive definition stated by Gilchrist Sparks and Lawrence
Hamermesh: a person entrusted with “administrative and
120. See RBC Capital Mkts. LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 865 n.191 (Del. 2015)
(articulating and illustrating this concept as applied to a financial advisor).
121. For this terminology, see Numeric Analytics, LLC v. McCabe, 161 F.
Supp. 3d 348, 358 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (determining that the fiduciary duty of LLC’s
President was “inherent to the role” she played as officer of entity formed and
headquartered in Pennsylvania; as a consequence, district court in Pennsylvania
had specific personal jurisdiction over the President for purposes of breach of
fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty claims).
122. See generally Winship, supra note 90, at 1195 (stating that, in contrast
to the ease with which directors are usually identified, “the definition of ‘officer’
is more fluid”).
123. Id. at 1195–96.
124. Supra Part III.
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executive functions” but not persons who lack “judgment or
discretion as to corporate matters.”125
Focusing on the status of corporate officers as agents
illustrates that definitional fluidity can carry consequences.
Consider first an officer’s externally-oriented role as an agent. By
assigning a title that’s conventionally held by an officer, the
corporation runs the risk of creating apparent authority in the
title-holder to do acts conventionally associated with an officer
holding a like title.126 For example, the apparent authority of a
corporation’s CEO encompasses transactions within the ordinary
course of the corporation’s business although the board has
restricted the CEO’s actual authority unbeknownst to third
parties.127 Likewise, by entitling an employee “CEO,” the
corporation as principal may create an appearance of authority on
which third parties have a right to rely when their belief in the
reality of authority is reasonable.128 Agency doctrine in this respect
is analogous to the partnership-law doctrine of partnership by
estoppel, which protects third parties who enter into transactions
on the basis of a representation that a person is a partner.129
Agency law thus responds to definitional fluidity by turning to
conventional usage and meaning associated with particular titles
and positions, keyed to the doctrine of apparent authority.
Now consider an internally-oriented perspective on the term
“officer” and its potential consequences. For its own purposes, a
125. Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 106, at 216.
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03, cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 2006)
(commenting on the dynamics of apparent authority in regards to organizational
executives).
127. See id. § 3.03, cmt. e(3) (covering the dynamics of officers and apparent
authority specifically). Numerous precedents define an officer’s apparent
authority to engage in actions comprising a corporation’s ordinary business. For
a potential regulatory implication, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC
Rule 14A-8’s Ordinary Business Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder
Micromanagement by Proposal, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 705, 738–40 (2016) (urging
SEC’s staff to turn to apparent-authority precedents to assess whether
shareholder proposal may be omitted from proxy statement because it concerns a
matter of corporation’s ordinary business).
128. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006)
(providing examples of apparent authority creation).
129. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 308(b) (amended 2013). Many thanks to Andrew Gold
who alerted me to this analogy.
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corporation may assign an officer’s title to an employee, either as
an honorific reward or to enable the employee to perform specified
tasks on the corporation’s behalf, despite the fact that the
employee’s job duties entail no executive or supervisory functions.
This practice is compatible with the non-prescriptive treatment of
the “officer” category in corporation statutes. To an employee,
being named an “officer” may appear to be internally meaningful
and to confer rights as against the corporation. Corporation
statutes in Delaware and other states permit a corporation to bind
itself to indemnify its directors and officers, whether present or
former, against expenses incurred in connection with litigation
related to their corporate positions, subject to limitations not
relevant for purposes of this Essay.130 Likewise, a corporation may
bind itself to advance litigation expenses incurred by a director or
officer,131 and may extend advancement rights to employees and
other agents through contract. One conventional route to create
such rights is through a bylaw provision stating that “officers” and
“directors” shall, to the extent permitted by law, receive
advancements and be indemnified.132 A set of bylaws might go
further in the direction of specificity by defining the meaning of
“officer” for this purpose by listing categories of eligible persons by
title.
In Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,133 the defendant’s
bylaws designated “vice presidents” as “officers” entitled to
indemnification and advancement, whether incumbent or former
occupants of an office.134 But the defendant resisted the plaintiff’s
demand for advancement in connection with the expenses of a
then-ongoing state prosecution.135 The plaintiff had copied
computer files and transferred them out of the defendant’s
organization to a competitor of the defendant’s when he joined it
130. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145(f) (2017) (detailing the application of
these indemnification provisions).
131. Id. § 145 (e)–(f).
132. Id. § 145 (f).
133. 765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014).
134. See id. at 354 (noting about one-third of the employees held the title of
vice president).
135. See id. at 353 (providing a timeline of the plaintiff’s indictments and
prosecutions).
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as an employee.136 The defendant also resisted the plaintiff’s
demand for indemnification based on his successful defense of an
earlier federal prosecution involving the same conduct.137 A
majority of a Third Circuit panel, applying Delaware law, held that
the bylaw’s use of “officer” was ambiguous and permitted the
defendant to introduce extrinsic evidence of trade usage
acknowledging the prevalence of “title inflation” in the financial
services industry.138 The plaintiff’s work consisted of computer
programming; his success led to his designation as a “vice
president” in the defendant’s equities division, but not to
responsibilities to supervise other employees or transact business
with third parties on behalf of the defendant.139 The Third Circuit
vacated the district court’s order granting summary judgment to
the plaintiff on the advancement question, remanding for further
proceedings.140 In dissent, one member of the panel argued that
under Delaware law the doctrine of contra proferentum should
apply to resolve against the defendant any arguable ambiguity.141
The defendant acted unilaterally in drafting its bylaws and should
be incentivized to clarify them.142
Issues of ambiguity aside, it’s understandable that the
defendant in Aleynikov might not wish to fund the plaintiff’s
ongoing defense given the underlying premise of the prosecution.
136. See id. at 354 (recounting that the plaintiff transferred the computer files
to a server in Germany on his last day of work).
137. See id. at 353 (elaborating on the plaintiff’s previous defense of the
federal prosecution). The status of Aleynikov’s state-court conviction remains
contested. See People v. Aleynikov, No. 1956, 2017 WL 327278, at *8 (N.Y. App.
Div. Jan. 24, 2017) (reversing trial court’s dismissal of conviction on two counts
of unlawful use of secret scientific materials under New York Penal Code
§ 165.07).
138. Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 364–65.
139. See id. at 354 (“He exercised no management or leadership
responsibilities.”).
140. See id. at 368 (finding genuine issues of material fact in need of further
proceedings). The district court had earlier denied the plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment on his claim for indemnification. Id. at 353.
141. See id. at 369 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (“Accordingly, Delaware law
requires us to apply the doctrine of contra proferentem and construe the provision
against [the defendant].”).
142. See id. at 370 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (giving public policy justifications
for applying the doctrine).
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But the defendant did not revise the terms applicable to the
plaintiff’s association with it, including rights to advancement, as
might be done by contract through an employment separation
agreement.143 The majority’s analysis enables the defendant to
have the benefit of discretion to be exercised when an “officer”
seeks advancement but without either taking prior unilateral
action to clarify the bylaw or restrict its coverage, or entering into
an individualized contract with the “officer” providing such
discretion to the corporation.
Additionally, the Third Circuit’s resolution is at odds with the
externally-oriented dimension of agency law discussed above. A
robust doctrine, apparent authority attaches consequences to
placing agents in defined positions or assigning titles
conventionally associated with actual authority of a particular
scope.144 True, the office of “vice president” may not carry actual or
apparent authority to bind the corporation in the absence of a
functional specification of responsibilities, for which the particular
vice president would have a customary level of authority over the
specified functional area (such as “sales”).145 In Aleynikov, the vice
president’s title did not include a functional designation, which
undercuts the prospect that he could act with apparent authority
in dealings with third parties on behalf of the defendant.146 And
unlike many vice presidents within banks, his job duties did not
require signing documents on behalf of the defendant.147 But
internally, the defendant’s own bylaws defined a “vice president”
143. For an example, see Flood v. ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 1110
(10th Cir. 2010) (determining the terms of former CEO’s separation agreement
conditioned advancement on determination that the best interests of the company
at the time of determination necessitated using funds to make advancement). In
Flood, the company’s CEO had been convicted on the underlying securities fraud
charges originating in an SEC investigation that began while the CEO was still
employed. Id. at 1111–12.
144. Supra notes 126–129 and accompanying text.
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03, cmt. e(4) (AM. LAW. INST. 2006)
(laying out the parameters of apparent authority in the context of vice presidents).
146. See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir.
2014) (detailing functional designations in the vice president title).
147. See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., C.A. No. 10636-VCL, 2016
WL 3763246, at *8–9 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2016) (Post-Trial Order and Final
Judgment) (examining duties commonly associated with vice presidents in the
banking industry), aff’d, __ A. 3d __ (Del. 2017), 2017 WL 443714.
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as an “officer” and explicitly assigned consequences to holding an
officer’s position.148 The defendant, that is, made a manifestation
to its “officers” through its bylaws about the consequences of
membership in that category, constituting an instance of
internally-oriented conduct that expresses meaning to persons
who, not advised otherwise, may rely on its explicit terms.149
A final issue is whether a defendant’s victory over its former
officer in an advancement claim might otherwise operate to
undercut the defendant’s position. In Aleynikov, the defendant
brought counterclaims against its former officer. Bound by the
issue preclusion stemming from the earlier Third Circuit ruling,
the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the former officer was
not entitled to advancement in connection with his defense of the
counterclaims (but also suggested that the Third Circuit may have
misunderstood Delaware law).150 If, as is typical in
post-employment disputes, a defendant’s counterclaims allege
breach of fiduciary duty, would the defendant undermine the
premise of fiduciary counterclaims by persuading an earlier court
that the employee was not an officer? As Professor Winship noted,
what “officer” means may be “who-knows-what for triggering statelaw fiduciary duties.”151
The common law of agency treats all employees regardless of
status or job duties as agents, who by definition owe fiduciary

148. See id. (providing an overview of the defined consequences associated
with holding an officer’s position).
149. An allied principle requires that an employer act prospectively and give
notice to affected employees when it modifies or revokes a prior binding promise
or policy statement concerning compensation. See generally RESTATEMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.04 (AM. LAW. INST. 2015). Also, when a dispute involves
multiple sources for indemnification and advancement, Delaware law requires
that they be read distinctively, not conjunctively, as independent sources of
rights. See Narayanan v. Sutherland Global Holdings, C.A. No. 11757–VCMR,
2016 WL 3682617, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 5, 2016) (concluding that the defendant
failed to prove that the bylaws and indemnification agreement were conjunctive).
Thus, a condition on advancement rights imposed in a bylaw is inapplicable to
advancement rights created by a contract that omits the condition unless the
corporation demonstrates that the two instruments were intended to operate
conjunctively.
150. See Aleynikov, 2016 WL 3763246, at *1–8 .
151. Winship, supra note 90, at 1195–96.
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duties to the principal.152 In some states, however, the “fiduciary”
label is confined to employees in positions of trust and confidence
with the employer; other employees may be subject to more limited
duties of loyalty.153 Thus, dislodging a now-former employee from
the “officer” category can risk vaulting the employer into the
terrain of “who-knows-what,” depending on the substance of the
conduct at issue in the counterclaim and the textured specifics of
the corporation’s relationship with its now-former employee.
V. Implications for Fiduciary Theory
Focusing on the status of corporate officers as agents has
implications for more general or theoretical accounts of fiduciary
law because it sharpens appreciation of the distinctiveness of
agency relationships. This Essay emphasizes the corporation’s
rights of control over its officers and mechanisms through which
control may be exercised, grounded in the principal’s right of
control as an essential or constitutive element of an agency
relationship.154 Distinctively, principals have power to give binding
instructions to agents, illustrated in this Essay by the directives
given by boards to senior officers in Gantler and Amalgamated
Bank.155 However, some general theories of fiduciary law require
that the fiduciary be able to exercise discretionary power.156 This
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. c. & § 8.01, cmt. b (AM.
LAW. INST. 2006). Agency law recognizes that “fiduciary obligation is not
monolithic in how it operates,” id. § 8.01, cmt. c, and that its scope and demands
turn on specifics of an agent’s position.
153. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 2015). An
employee, whether or not in a position of trust and confidence with the employer,
breaches a duty of loyalty by misappropriating the employer’s property, whether
tangible or intangible. Id. § 8.01(b)(iii).
154. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666–67 (2013) (identifying
right of control as one of the hallmarks of an agency relationship).
155. Supra Part III.
156. See, e.g., Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J.
235, 262 (2011). Although not central to my own scholarship, I mention the
fiduciary’s possession of discretion as a common characteristic of fiduciary
relationships. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis
of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 908. Many years on, I’ve come to
appreciate that this is inconsistent with agency law, including for my account of
the significance of an agent’s interpretation of instructions furnished by the
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is at odds with the basic definition of agency, to which the
principal’s right of control is essential.157 And, as Gantler and
Amalgamated Bank illustrate, it’s not always desirable that an
officer exercise discretion, a determination to be made by the board
of directors, not the officer acting unilaterally.
One potential response, the taxonomic move of expelling
agents from the fiduciary family, runs counter to long-established
law. It also ignores the fact, as Julian Velasco observes, that
“[a]gency bears the most important hallmarks of a fiduciary
relationship: the principal entrusts the agent with power, and
becomes vulnerable as a result.”158 Or one might stretch
“discretion,” or eliminate the requirement of discretion from the
general definition of fiduciary.159 Regardless of the misfit between
theoretical accounts of fiduciary law and agency, corporate officers
illustrate the stakes associated with treating agents as fiduciaries,
even when the principal has not conferred discretion. A corporation
is vulnerable to its officers’ exercise of power, which is conferred by
the principal, and the corporation’s attempt to limit its
vulnerability through tightly-defined directives should not
undercut its fiduciary relationship with its officers. Nor should it
enable officers to obtain material benefits through the exercise of
delegated power without the principal’s informed consent.160
principal. DeMott, Fiduciary Character, supra note 55.
157. See Julian Velasco, Delimiting Fiduciary Status, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON FIDUCIARY LAW (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold, eds. forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 11) (on file with author); Alice Woolley, The Lawyer as Fiduciary:
Defining Private Law Duties in Public Law Relations, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 285,
309–15 (2015).
158. Velasco, supra note 157, (manuscript at 12).
159. Id. (manuscript at 12–13); see also Arthur Laby, Book Review, 35 LAW &
PHIL. 123, 132 (2016) (reviewing PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW
(Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds. 2014) and characterizing the work as
having a “too reductionist” approach that casts discretionary authority as a
necessary condition for a fiduciary relationships).
160. For example, if a board of directors instructs the corporation’s treasurer
to execute a particular transaction on particular terms, the treasurer is not free
to front-run the transaction just because the instruction conferred no discretion.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006) (“An agent has
a duty not to acquire a material benefit from third party in connection with
transactions . . . taken on behalf of the principal . . . .”). Front-running may also
constitute a crime. See Christopher M. Matthews, HSBC Executive Arrested in
U.S., WALL ST. J., July 21, 2016 at C1 (explaining how two top bank executives,
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VI. Conclusion
The scholarship of Lyman Johnson and David Millon is
extensive as well as multi-faceted. Additionally, the line of work
celebrated in this Essay was prescient in recasting the account of
corporate officers into terms centered on officers’ status as agents.
As Lyman and David demonstrated, understanding how the law
treats officers’ positions and duties requires acknowledging that
officers are agents. Their scholarship continues to furnish an
analytic and normative framework for assessing subsequent
developments, a hallmark of enduring influence.

learning that client had engaged bank to execute $3.5 billion currency exchange,
front-ran order, netted millions for bank and for themselves by stockpiling
millions of pounds, driving up price of pound, prior to execution of exchange of
client’s dollars for pounds).

